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Increasing technological complexity, the rising frequency of severe natural events and increasing 
societal vulnerability are factors that result in a combination of new threats. Seveso sites are 
industrial sites storing or processing relevant quantities of hazardous substances. To date, in 
Europe the main issue with such industrial installations has been the protection of citizens from 
industrial activities based on safety promotion, as required by the Seveso Directives. 
However, the European framework drastically changed since late 2015, calling attention on 
intentional acts of interference as credible initiating events for major accidents. Seveso sites 
potentially constitute an attractive target by a variety of criminal categories for a wide range of 
reasons (Argenti et al., 2015): the impact of society of an intentional release of such substances, or 
even the possibility to steal them and use them for the preparation of improvised explosive devices 
or other types of weapons used in CBRNE (Chemical Biological Nuclear Explosive) attack 
scenarios (Reniers et al., 2015; Reniers and Audenaert, 2014). 
In perspective, competent authorities for Seveso Directive may require safety reports issued 
under Seveso-III Directive to include scenarios triggered by intentional events. Thus, the 
conventional approach to safety and security of Seveso sites should undergo a paradigm shift, and 
be looked upon pro-actively and strategically from the level of industrial clusters, on top of the 
traditional approach limited to single plants. On the one hand, the safety perspective based on 
internal assessment of conventional accidents required by the Seveso Directive (2012/18/EU) 
should be integrated with a holistic assessment of threats. On the other hand, consequence and 
impact assessment should be extended to consider cascading events that, through strong multi-
sectorial dependencies and indirect impacts, may affect the population, industry, critical 
infrastructures (2008/114/EC) and  society. 
Major accident hazards are related to the release, mostly unintentional, of chemicals stored or 
processed in industrial sites. CBRNE scenarios are caused by the intentional release of a Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, with malicious intents.  
The prevention and mitigation of CBRNE and Major Accident Hazards go hand-in-hand and 
dedicated solutions for either one of the scenario categories may be less robust and less cost-
effective nowadays (Aven, 2007; Bajpai and Gupta, 2007). A growing interrelation is present 
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among these types of scenarios, and common models and tools and all kinds of other 
countermeasures may be used to prevent, assess and control their impact. The enhancement of the 
capacity of response and resilience of industrial system to malicious attacks must integrate 
preventive aspects, typical of cyber-security, industrial aspects, which mainly relate to the physical 
dimension of the plants, and aspects related to the protection and security of critical infrastructure 
and population (Landucci et al., 2015). The application of new methodologies, skills and 
technologies is a key element of the strategy for responding to such new and emerging threats 
(Argenti et al., 2017). 
The development of new methodologies, skills and technologies is a key element of the 
strategy for responding to new and emerging threats. An increasing consciousness of the above is 
growing at European level, where the European Commission, within the H2020 program 
addressing Secure Societies is now widening the community of users (CoU) to safety practitioners 
involved in the safety and security of Seveso sites, with the aim of creating new synergies among 
safety and security. 
In this framework, a number of topics may be identified for future research in safety and 
security. Among others, the following may arise as key issues to improve synergies among safety 
and security achieving more robust solutions for the holistic protection of Seveso sites. 
Improved threat assessment and procedures for accident scenario identification should be 
developed, considering the entire supply chain integrating Seveso sites, thus also transport systems 
as pipelines and road, rail and marine/fluvial transportation of hazardous materials. Multi-sectorial 
dependencies should be identified, introducing a system dynamics perspective to scenario 
identification, linking the issue to the relevant research effort currently devoted to dynamic risk 
assessment (Khan et al., 2016; Villa et al., 2016). 
The development of tools for the assessment of impacts, specifically focusing on cascading 
events that may propagate the effects to interconnected sectors and on the vulnerability of different 
areas, population categories, industries and infrastructures is also a critical issue, that may in 
perspective provide a more robust decision making context for the effective protection of the 
population. This may be linked to the development of tools for integrated protection strategies and 
decision-making in the short term, addressing critical vulnerabilities and measures, and in the long 
term, addressing system robustness and resilience also by an improved system-of-system-of-
systems approach. 
The above may be related as well to the development of improved and validated models for 
consequence and impact assessment, including cascading events all the way up to societal impact, 
joined to the application and exploitation of such models to major accident and CBRNE scenarios 
training and exercise 
These are only few examples of a list of urgent research actions that should be considered to 
promote synergies among safety and security, aiming at the creation of an overall framework 
sharing competences and solutions with the ultimate goal of obtaining a safe and secure society. 
 
References 
Argenti F, Landucci G, Spadoni G, Cozzani V. The assessment of the attractiveness of process 
facilities to terrorist attacks. Safety Science, 2015; 77:169-181. 
Cozzani V / Journal of Integrated Security Science 2017 (1) 32-34    34 
 
Argenti F, Landucci G, Cozzani V, Reniers G. A study on the performance assessment of anti-
terrorism physical protection systems in chemical plants. Safety Science; 2017; 94:181-196. 
Aven T. A unified framework for risk and vulnerability analysis covering both safety and security. 
Reliability Engineering & System Safety, 2007; 92:745–754. 
Bajpai S, Gupta JP. Terror-Proofing Chemical Process Industries. Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection, 2007; 85:559–565. 
Khan F, Hashemi SJ, Paltrinieri N, Amyotte P, Cozzani V, Reniers G. Dynamic risk management: 
a contemporary approach to process safety management. Current Opinions in Chemical 
Engineering, 2016; 14:9-17. 
Landucci G, Reniers G, Cozzani V, Salzano E. Vulnerability of Industrial Facilities to Attacks 
with Improvised Explosives Devices aimed at triggering Domino Scenarios. Reliability 
Engineering and System Safety, 2015; 143:53-62. 
Reniers G, Audenaert A. Preparing for major terrorist attacks against chemical clusters: 
Intelligently planning protection measures w.r.t. domino effects. Process Safety and 
Environmental Protection, 2014; 92:583-589. 
Reniers G, Van Lerberghe P,  Van Gulijk C. Security risk assessment and protection in the 
chemical and process industry. Process Safety Progress, 2015; 34:72-83. 
Villa V, Paltrinieri P, Khan F, Cozzani V. Towards dynamic risk analysis: a review of the risk 
assessment approach and its limitations in the chemical process industry. Safety Science, 2016; 
89:77-93. 
